Review of 'Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia: Russian and East European Government Politics and Policy' [Book Review] by Dragovic-Soso, Jasna
Published on Reviews in History (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews)
Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia: Russian and 
East European Government Politics and Policy
Review Number: 
1990
Publish date: 
Thursday, 15 September, 2016
Author: 
Veljko Vuja?i?
ISBN: 
9781107074088
Date of Publication: 
2015
Price: 
£58.49
Pages: 
336pp.
Publisher: 
Cambridge University Press
Publisher url: 
http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/russian-and-east-european-
government-politics-and-policy/nationalism-myth-and-state-russia-and-serbia-antecedents-dissolution-soviet-
union-and-yugoslavia?format=HB
Place of Publication: 
Cambridge
Reviewer: 
Jasna Dragovic-Soso
The disintegration of communist federations at the end of the Cold War represented the most momentous 
reconfiguration of the boundaries of Eastern Europe since 1945. Not only did dominant ideologies and 
power centres that had defined Europe’s political, social and economic life implode rather suddenly, but 
states that had been in existence for most of the 20th century rather unexpectedly disappeared from the map 
within the span of a few years. In this redrawing of Europe’s eastern borders, the Czecho-Slovak ‘velvet 
divorce’ and the largely peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union stood in stark contrast to Yugoslavia’s 
violent disintegration, which cost over 130,000 lives and the brutal displacement of at least two million 
people throughout the region and beyond (Glas inicijative REKOM, January 2013). The contrast between the 
dissolutions of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union is particularly striking when taking into account the similar 
position of the two dominant nations, the Serbs and the Russians, a significant proportion of whom were left 
outside the borders of the new Serbian and Russian states. Whereas in the Serbian case, the ‘pre?ani Serbs’ 
outside Serbia contested the new state borders and – aided and abetted by Slobodan Miloševi?’s regime in 
the Republic of Serbia – launched an armed insurgency, in the Russian case, the approximately 25 million 
Russians left outside the Russian republic put up no resistance and even embraced their new state entities. 
While some violence accompanied the disintegration in 1991 of the Soviet Union in the peripheral regions, it 
was remarkably absent in those areas with the largest ethnic Russian populations (notably Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan). These different trajectories of the two multinational socialist federations and their ‘dominant 
nations’ provide the puzzle that Veljko Vuja?i?’s illuminating study of Russian and Serbian nationalism 
seeks to explain.
Of course, Vuja?i? is not the first to examine these dissolutions and their different outcomes. Together, the 
Soviet and Yugoslav disintegrations have given rise to a veritable cottage industry of writings – ranging 
from journalists’ accounts and scholarly analyses to policy assessments and memoirs. Most of these books 
focus on the period immediately preceding dissolution and provide elite-driven explanations, focusing on the 
personalities and actions of leaders (Slobodan Miloševi? in the Yugoslav case, and Mikhail Gorbachev and 
Boris Yeltsin in the Soviet one) as fundamental both for state dissolution itself and the nature of this process. 
Others highlight structural factors, such as the location and compactness of minority populations and the 
emergence of security dilemmas in the two scenarios; and still others note the evolution of socialist 
federalism and the important role of institutions, notably the communist parties and the armies, in 
determining the respective trajectories of the two states. Vuja?i? surveys some of these explanations, 
pointing out their limitations and calling for a multi-causal approach. Above all, he highlights the 
importance of historically forged national ideology as a ‘necessary antecedent condition’ (p. 5) in explaining 
the divergent nature and outcomes of the process of state dissolution in the two cases.
When historical legacies and national ideologies are invoked in the literature, this is often done in a 
deterministic way – from the by now thoroughly debunked ‘ancient hatreds’ thesis in the Yugoslav case to 
the more scholarly yet sometimes equally blinkered vision of immutable national ideologies, portrayed either 
as a constant striving for hegemony or a continuous desire to oppress and annihilate the national/ethnic 
‘others’. While adopting a longue durée framework, Vuja?i? consciously avoids these pitfalls, focusing 
instead on the ways in which the Russians’ and Serbs’ ethnic foundational myths (mythomoteurs) were 
transformed and reinforced by historical and political experiences in the modern period, and how they in turn 
informed collective political and social approaches to the state. Applying Max Weber’s conception of the 
nation as a ‘cultural community of shared memories and common political destiny’ (p. 71), Vuja?i? 
differentiates between civic, ethnic and ‘state’ conceptions of nationhood – all of which co-habited the 
cultural and political space of the 19th and 20th Centuries and gave rise to alternative political agendas and 
discourses. The book’s central argument is that the radically different historical legacies of state- and nation-
building by Russian and Serbian elites – along with the specific historical experiences that cemented the 
Russians’ and Serbs’ national myths and narratives – produced different forms of nationalist mobilization 
and different trajectories of state dissolution in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Vuja?i?’s argument focuses on the predominant vision of the state itself among Russians and Serbs, forged 
as it was in the two cases by completely opposed experiences of empire and state-building. In the Russian 
case, the birth of an ethnic mythomoteur in the early 17th century – embodied by the notion of ‘Holy Russia’ 
(Sviataia Rus) as a community of the Orthodox peasantry – created a sense of collective belonging that was 
distinct from the Russian empire (Rossiiskaia imperiia). Vuja?i? argues that this contrast between the 
imperial state (Rossiia) and the Russian peasantry (Rus) represented ‘a fundamental rift between the state 
and the people that would haunt imperial Russia throughout its existence, inhibiting the kind of positive 
identification between national Kultur and the state that stood at foundation of the modern concept of the 
nation’ (pp. 101–2). Subsequent historical developments, such as the codification of serfdom and Peter the 
Great’s ‘coercive modernization’ policies, cemented the perception that the imperial state was alien to the 
people and contributed to the emergence in the 19th century of a liberal romantic nationalism and a 
revolutionary movement that were both opposed to the official Russian state. Vuja?i? argues that this gulf 
between state and society continued into the 20th century despite the politically diverse national programmes 
that sought to overcome it, finding further confirmation during the Soviet period, which saw ‘the total 
subordination of popular (peasant) Russia to the all-powerful Soviet state’ (p. 170).
Soviet nationality policy territorialised and institutionalised ethnicity in the 1920s and 1930s, creating a 
federal structure and allocating bureaucratic positions according to nationality, and it also codified ethnic 
belonging through the introduction of internal passports. In this system, Russian nationhood was treated as a 
residual category – with the Russian Republic devoid of the cultural and institutional trappings of statehood 
enjoyed by other republics – while at the same time Russians were, as Vuja?i? states, ‘in a recognizable 
sense, the dominant nation in the Soviet Union’ and ‘the main ethnic glue of the new Soviet state even if 
only as carriers of the universal communist message’ (p. 173). This dominance came at the price of 
repressing any manifestation of Russian national identity and replacing it with an ideologically conditioned 
Soviet ‘state nationalism’ as its only legitimate expression – a policy that was most explicitly and coercively 
pursued under Stalin but was largely maintained by his successors. As Vuja?i? puts it: ‘In short, the 
continued dominance of Russians in the USSR was purchased at the price of dissolving the Russian nation in 
the Soviet state’ (p. 197).
The implications of this historical legacy for the dissolution of the Soviet state in the 1990s were twofold. 
First of all, Russians had a historically rooted vision of the state as an alien, autocratic and coercive entity 
that had remained separate from the Russian people. The defenders of the Soviet Union following the failed 
coup of 1991 were viewed in this light, lacking broader legitimacy and failing to attract a critical mass of the 
population that would be vested in preserving the Soviet Union, particularly at the cost of further coercion. 
Secondly, the historical repression of an ethnic Russian national identity meant that when the Soviet Union 
imploded, there was no alternative programme for a pan-Russian ethnic unification that could have 
undermined the existing republican borders of the now de-legitimized federation. In fact, as Vuja?i? shows, 
the historical experience of common victimization by the Stalinist state in the 1930s – regardless of national 
belonging – meant that ethnic Russians in neighbouring republics could accept or even support 
independence movements to break away from the coercive central state (p. 41).
The Serbian case had some initial commonalities with the Russian. Here too, the emergence of an ethnic 
mythomoteur centred around the differentiation between the Orthodox peasantry and the dynastic Ottoman 
and Habsburg empires, both of which rejected popular sovereignty and offered few opportunities for 
individual betterment. In the Serbian case, however, the Orthodox Church was not linked to the ruling 
imperial centres, but held instead important religious, legal and administrative power over its flock, thanks to 
the Ottoman millet system which allowed a degree of autonomy for non-Muslims in the empire. Even in the 
Habsburg empire, Orthodox Christian settlers of the military frontier bordering on the Ottoman lands 
enjoyed freedom of worship and self-rule within their own village communities and extended family 
structures (zadruge). It was thus logical for them to eventually develop a national identity based on ethnic 
and religious particularism, in which the Orthodox Church played a key role. The Church was also 
instrumental in the development of the Kosovo myth, the Serbs’ foundational national myth, telling of 
heroism and sacrifice and the loss of the medieval Serbian state as the start of the ‘long Turkish night’ of 
alien rule. The subsequent adaptation of this story into a full-fledged nationalist narrative over the course of 
the 19th century, when the Serbian peasantry revolted against the Ottoman Empire, eventually creating a 
state of its own, further reinforced this idea of the national state as the Serbs’ ultimate protector and unifier. 
In contrast to the Russian case, Serb political and cultural elites maintained a strong attachment to ‘the idea 
of the state as the embodiment of national purpose’ (p. 40) and as something that was worth fighting and 
dying for. The formative experience of the First World War with its extraordinary human losses—when 
Serbs as ‘a nation of less than 5 million lost more than 1,2000,000 people (or 27 per cent of its population), 
of which about two thirds were civilians’ (p. 153) – reinforced the narratives of heroism and sacrifice against 
the odds, which was at the heart of the Kosovo myth, and fostered a sense of allegiance to the state that had 
been successfully defended at such tremendous cost.
As Vuja?i? shows, the Serbs’ experience of multi-national Yugoslavia – first as an inter-war kingdom and 
then as a socialist federation – also differed quite significantly from the Russian relationship with the Soviet 
state. A Serbian national programme developed in 1844 by Serbia’s main statesman of the time, Ilija 
Garašanin – the Na?ertanije – envisaged the unification of what he considered to be ‘Serbian lands’ 
(Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) into a larger Serbian state with an outlet to the Adriatic 
Sea (p. 198). Although Vuja?i? convincingly contests portrayals of this programme as a ‘protoimperial’ plan 
for Serb hegemony in the Yugoslav state of the future, he notes nevertheless that is ‘easy to see how 
Garašanin’s “larger Serbia” could become a step toward “Great Serbia” and how the latter, in turn could 
dominate the future South Slav state’ (pp. 199–200). He thus argues that the idea of unifying all Serbs in one 
state was not incompatible with the cause of unifying the South Slavs, and that ‘one could believe in the 
cause of Yugoslav unity and remain a Serbian nationalist’ (p. 201). Allegiance to the new Yugoslav state 
was a natural extension from loyalty to the Kingdom of Serbia, as the goal of national unity was now 
accomplished and the Serbs became the new state’s most numerous and influential ‘dominant nation’. When 
this first Yugoslav state became increasingly contested by Croatian national elites – eventually leading in 
1939 to the brokering of a Croat-Serb ‘Agreement’(Sporazum), which created a Croatian federal unit within 
Yugoslavia – the original programme of Serbian unification into a national state could provide an alternative 
platform. This was evidenced by the arguments of an influential group of Serbian intellectuals who, for the 
first time since the creation of Yugoslavia, called for the creation of a separate Serbian territorial unit, albeit 
in this case within the broader Yugoslav state (p. 213).
In contrast to the Soviet-Russian case, the socialist Yugoslav federation created in 1945 did not treat the 
Serbs as its ‘ethnic glue’. Indeed, the communist leadership went to considerable lengths to ensure that Serbs 
would not dominate the second Yugoslavia. Within the federal structure, Serbia was the only Yugoslav 
republic that contained two autonomous entities, Kosovo and Vojvodina, while Serbs in the republics of 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were not given any territorial autonomy, despite there being similar 
ethnic and historical grounds for potentially doing so (p. 237). The effects of this policy were twofold. On 
the one hand, it meant that when Yugoslavia was increasingly transformed into a socialist confederation 
from the late 1960s onward, ‘the communists’ early postwar decisions about the borders between federal 
units became the main source of Serbian national grievances’ (p. 235). On the other hand, this treatment of 
Serbia as just another republic, with its own cultural and political institutions, enabled it to become the focal 
point of the Serbian nationalist revival in the 1980s – first manifested as a programme for the 
recentralisation of Yugoslavia and, when this met with staunch resistance in Croatia and Slovenia, with a 
programme for a unification of all Serbs in a single national state (the ‘Greater Serbia’ idea). The historical 
legacy of Serbia’s independent statehood and the identification of the nation with the state as its natural 
protector and unifier meant that, when Yugoslavia sank into its deep and multi-faceted crisis in its last 
decade, a ‘fallback option’ existed and could be deployed to mobilise Serbs. This was very different from the 
Russian experience, where no such programme of Russian national unification outside the Soviet Union had 
been developed (p. 41).
The contrast between the Russians’ and the Serbs’ national myths and narratives and their different 
respective trajectories at the time of state dissolution also resided in their different collective memories of 
the key formative event of the Second World War. Vuja?i? highlights the experience of the war as 
fundamental to cementing the Serbs’ national narrative of unity and statehood as the ultimate source of 
protection and survival. Rather than focusing on the narratives about the war articulated by Belgrade 
intellectuals and Serbia’s leader Slobodan Miloševi?, as others have done, Vuja?i? highlights the importance 
of the wartime experience for the ‘diaspora’ Serbs. Their shared collective memory of victimisation in the 
wartime Independent State of Croatia, where they constituted about one-half of all victims (p. 234), left a 
legacy that could be easily mobilised against the independence of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1991. This experience also explains the ‘diaspora’ Serbs’ relative overrepresentation in the Partisan 
movement (in autumn 1943 they still made up three-fifths of the Partisan movement, p. 230) and their 
special role in Yugoslavia’s reunification under the communists – which was reflected in their 
disproportionate membership of state institutions and leading roles in the Yugoslav People’s Army (p. 237). 
All this gave them a particular stake in the continuity of socialist Yugoslavia as a single state and later 
turned them into a critical constituency for elite-led ‘statist-nationalist mobilisation’ as Yugoslavia fell apart 
in the early 1990s (p. 41).
Vuja?i? argues that the Russian experience of the war was fundamentally different. For Russians, the first 
two years of the war produced an ethos of ‘a civic appeal to solidarity in the service of the Motherland’ 
which replaced Stalin as ‘the main locus of loyalty’ and which represented a time of ‘relative freedom’ and 
‘”spontaneous de-Stalinization”’ (pp. 191–2). However, as victory became more palpable after 1943, these 
limited freedoms were gradually withdrawn and the cult of Stalin as ‘the infallible wartime leader’ was 
revived (p. 193). The victory, secured at the cost of incredible human losses, was officially portrayed as the 
victory of Stalin and the Soviet state, in which ordinary people were, to quote Stalin, mere ‘”cogs” in our 
great state mechanism’ (p. 194). In this respect, Vuja?i? tells us, the Russian experience of the war was no 
different from that of other Soviet nations. In contrast to the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
‘the shared Russian-Ukrainian memory of common victimization by the Stalinist state in the 1930s and Nazi 
invader in the 1940s increased the likelihood that Russians in Ukraine would accept and even support 
Ukraine’s independence from the “imperial center”’ (p. 41). It also reinforced the notion that – whereas for 
Serbs the state was a source of salvation and protection – for Russians it was equated with victimisation and 
oppression. Abandoning the Soviet Union was a form of liberation.
Vuja?i?’s argument is nuanced, compelling and well-supported throughout. It provides a masterful overview 
of the historical legacies that gave rise to such different trajectories of the Russians and the Serbs in the 
1990s. However, as Vuja?i? himself notes in his postscript, the dawn of a Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 
2014 does raise questions about the durability of these particular legacies and the presence of alternative 
national myths and narratives that could be deployed in very different ways. Vuja?i? presents a spirited 
defence of his analysis and convincingly argues that 2014 was not merely a delayed Russian reaction to the 
end of the Soviet Union but the outcome of a new set of circumstances and of a particular evolution of the 
Ukrainian and Russian states and societies since independence. However, does this not undermine to some 
degree his argument about historical legacies and ‘antecedent conditions’? More specifically, are some of the 
key legacies invoked by Vuja?i? in the Russian case – namely the legacy of ‘anti-statism’ combined with a 
commonality of experience of Russians and Ukrainians during the Second World War – still relevant in the 
current conflict? Or have these now been superseded by other legacies and national myths focused on 
differences and past conflict? Many commentators of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict have highlighted the 
widely divergent uses of the wartime past in contemporary Ukrainian and Russian national narratives and the 
revival of a type of nostalgia for the Soviet state – something that Vuja?i? himself notes (pp. 302–3). 
Historical legacies are important because they predetermine certain outcomes – or at least make them more 
likely. But if multiple legacies and conditions co-exist and can become dominant at any given time, giving 
rise to completely opposite outcomes, then what does this tell us about the overall explanatory power of an 
argument centred around historical legacies? This evolution in Russian-Ukrainian relations points rather to 
the transience of historical legacies and the malleability of national narratives.
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